A surprising contact on LinkedIn. A proposal of work from a recruiter, probably a female agent, operating from China. The chance to earn perhaps £20,000 part-time writing a small number of geopolitical reports for a firm from China containing “non-public” or “insider” information. Compensation in cryptocurrency or cash preferred.
It may seem obvious, on this telling, that an element about this method would be amiss. Nevertheless, China’s powerful intelligence agency still considers it worthwhile to deploy headhunters to try it – prompting MI5 to issue multiple warnings about their activity online.
Large-Scale Contact Attempts on Social Media
In 2023, the head of MI5 the agency's director said operatives from China were contacting UK citizens on the platform on an unprecedented scale, at a rate of ten thousand over the preceding 30-month period, attempting to obtain governmental, commercial, military and technological classified information. But a fresh campaign aimed at politicians and parliament has led the spy agency to act again.
A spying warning was distributed on this week via the offices of the Commons speaker and his House of Lords counterpart: a brief presentation after the persistent attempts of certain individuals and other operatives to contact MPs, lords, their assistants, economic experts, thinktanks – anyone who might become a source.
Security Strategy and Legislative Changes
In the typical manner of British intelligence, there was no publication of the protective guidance from MI5 or the interior ministry. But the agency was aware its briefing note would become public once it was emailed out to Westminster. Sharing it in the press assists the wider public better identify communications with a fraudulent purpose.
This warning has the impact of uncovering additional details from within parliament, though that is not the agency's main objective. The agency wants people in public life to understand that just because exchanges on professional networks are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are without risk.
Nor is domestic spy agency understood to have been reacting to any specific incident in the legislature, although the burst of activity occur after the awkward collapse of the legal case of a former parliamentary aide an individual and his friend Christopher Berry on a legal detail in recent months.
The two had been accused of spying for the foreign power – a charge they denied – but inability to complete a prosecution under the now repealed Official Secrets Act led to concerns that the UK's political system had been left unprotected.
Updated Legislation and China's Strategic Interests
The law has now been changed, and the security briefing includes a note of its successor: “Those engaging in espionage activity face substantial legal consequences under the new security law.” This constitutes a criminal offense if somebody engages in conduct that could potentially “materially assist a foreign intelligence service”.
An obvious inquiry, though, is what Beijing has to gain. A politician who is outside ministerial roles will have restricted access of sensitive information, and an contact of theirs even less. But the Chinese government is also interested in parliament: for a period, in 2020 and 2021, the UK’s China policy on issues such as the telecom firm or the Uyghur repression or alleged atrocities was being driven by MPs.
Cultural Variations and Ongoing Cyber Risks
To a degree there are cultural differences as well. Authoritarian governments like China’s utilize information gathering methods and the scale of its intelligence apparatus is enormous, engaging 300,000 individuals. A former US official, a American cybersecurity head under the US administration, said it was occasionally assessed that “the Chinese have greater linguistic capacity engaged in this than Western agencies have personnel with language skills”.
The Chinese government is prepared to develop people over the long term and at times even the agencies have found it difficult to differentiate legitimate relationships and spying. “Beijing has a minimal requirement for which details is deemed to be useful,” security minister a government official told parliamentarians on Wednesday, but a rapid shift in the government situation may result in someone rapidly marginal turning important.
Another way to consider the continuous efforts at secret information gathering is in the broader framework of the international competition between Beijing and the Western nations at a threshold under the level of outright war. China has increased its hacking efforts, with the one campaign infiltration of phone and data networks in 80 countries, and the another operation compromise of millions connected equipment.
Beijing is engaged in relentless attempts to find covert sources on UK politics via digital means because it wants to be provocative, to demonstrate influence and because it can.
